W
hat keeps a "Union of Sovereign (ex-Soviet?) Republics" together? The dissolution of the communist party and the wave of declarations of independence that followed the aborted coup attempt of August 1991 show that socialism cannot provide a glue to keep the Soviet empire intact. However, Western experts (and the central union government) have often argued against granting individual republics independence on the ground that this would involve large economic costs. The purpose of this paper is therefore to discuss whether this is indeed true, i.e. the paper tries to determine whether some republics would gain by leaving the Soviet Union. In analytical terms this is equivalent to asking whether economic considerations could provide a justification for keeping the Soviet Union at least an economic and monetary union.
The short answer is no: the more developed republics west of the Urals would probably gain from leaving the Soviet Union. These republics would want to liberalise their economies faster, they would have a stable currency and they can expect to trade more with the outside world than with the rest of the Soviet Union once their economies have been liberalised.
The Commission of the European Communities has recently published its findings on the Soviet economy argui ng that it would be preferable to keep the Soviet Union an economic and monetary union (EMU). This paper comes to a different result because it considers explicitly an alternative which was neglected (perhaps for obvious political reasons) in the report of the Commission, namely that some republics might prefer to integrate their * Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, and Visiting Professor, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium.
INTERECONOMICS, September/October 1991 economies more with the emerging European EMU than the rest of the Soviet Union. This paper begins by discussing the issue that dominates the present political agenda, namely whether a centralised approach to reform is preferable to leaving this decision to individual republics in order to introduce competition in reform. It then analyses the importance of the "Soviet" common market, i.e. the costs and benefits for any individual republic of participating in a Soviet customs union, and discusses the incentives for individual republics to keep the rouble as their currency. Finally, a comparison is made of the integration process in the EC and the disintegration process in the Soviet Union.
Centrelised Reform?
The Union vs. republics controversy has undoubtedly delayed the implementation of fundamental reforms, but this does not necessarily imply that a centralised reform plan is the best option. Fundamentally the issue is the following: at present there is a vast economic area with completely distorted prices and without the necessary legal and institutional framework for a market economy. Can any sub-unit of this area gain by implementing reforms on its own and thus allowing its inhabitants to trade freely at "true" market prices? In general the answer should be yes.
It is often alleged that price reform has to be implemented at the union level because differences in prices would lead consumers to buy where the goods are cheapest. As long as the rouble remains the common currency of the Soviet Union, and there are no restrictions on inter-republican trade, price reform in one republic alone would indeed make it profitable to arbitrage price differences. However, this arbitrage is the essence of a market economy and should thus not be viewed as a cost.
If any republic were to implement a radical reform programme 1 its price structure would be different from that of the rest of the Union. Residents of other republics would then certainly come to "plunder" its shops for those goods that are cheaper in that particular republic. However, this "plunder" is in reality an advantage since all these goods will be sold at their marginal cost of production and an increase in demand can only lead to an increase in the surplus of domestic producers. 2 Vice versa, consumers from the republic that initiated a reform in isolation would gain by buying goods in the rest of the Union at the old subsidised prices.
In reality, however, shops in the Soviet Union are now mostly empty. This implies that the impact of a radical reform on the supply of new goods and the distribution system should be more important than changing the price structure of the limited number of old goods that are actually available at their official price. Entrepreneurs in a republic that was the first to implement fundamental reforms would therefore gain by being able to satisfy a pent-up demand for diversified products coming from the entire union area.
The rest of the Union loses from an uncoordinated reform process to the extent that residents of the republic that initiates reforms on its own then buy more Union goods that are priced below cost. However, this is a consequence of the distorted Union price structure and should not be regarded as a cost of an uncoordinated price reform. On the contrary, this effect has the advantage that it is an incentive to implement reforms in the remainder of the Union as well.
The spill-over effects through goods arbitrage that arise from an uncoordinated reform process thus do not constitute a valid argument for a centralised reform process. Moreover, experience has shown that a credible reform strategy has to be adapted to the specific local circumstances. Some competition to find out the best way towards a market economy should therefore be beneficial.
A further argument for allowing the republics to implement their own reforms is that the creation of a market economy is impossible without support from an administration that executes and interprets the new laws in the new spirit? It is much easier to set up and control such an administration in a small Baltic state than for the entire Soviet Union whose total administrative body runs into the millions.
These arguments suggest that the implementation of the reforms should also be left to the republics. However, in the present highly uncertain legal and political framework, the bureaucracy of the Union and the remnants of the KGB can deter entrepreneurs from exploiting opportunities created by the laws of the republics. A new Union treaty to establish the rule of law and clear up some of the legal uncertainties seems therefore to be a precondition for an effective devolution of the reform process.
A "Soviet" Customs Union?
Despite the customs administration instituted by some smaller republics, goods and services can still freely cross republican boundaries. The Soviet Union is thus still an economic union, which is usually defined as a unified market inside which goods, services, capital and people can move without any obstacles. It has been estimated that the elimination of the remaining, small, barriers to intra-EC trade by the 1992 programme will bring large economic benefits (up to 4-6% of the Community's GDP"). The kind of trade barriers contemplated by some republics would thus imply very large economic costs indeed. There is therefore, a priori, a strong case against the imposition of customs borders between republics, which would break up the Soviet economic union.
However, even recognizing that trade barriers between republics are not warranted, a number of republics might want to conduct their own commercial policies because any republic that participates in the Soviet economic sphere would have to adopt the same barriers (tariffs or quotas) for trade with the rest of the world as the rest of the Soviet Union. 5 Once the transition period is over (during the transition regional protectionism may in certain special cases be justified 6) the fundamental question for each republic is whether it gains more from participating in world trade on its own than from participating in free trade within the Soviet Union but adopting the Union's trade barriers vis-&-vis the outside world.
